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A b s tra c t
Latin Am erica has experienced s ign ifican t Increases in 
urbanization since World War II and dramatic declines in crude birth 
rate since the late 1960's. Planners may try to link these two 
phenomena and claim that an Increasing rate of urbanization will 
precipitate a sim ilar increase In rate of fertility decline. But rapid 
urbanization is associated with severe problems in overcrowded big 
cities. This study has found that, in fact, the rate of urbanization has 
nc) causal link to changes in the fertility rate. Furthermore, although 
studies of Third World fe rtility  have found that fam ily planning 
programs make significant contributions to fertility  decline, in the 
Latin American context, education is more important.
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L  INTRODUCTION
In many Latin American countries, mortality rates began falling just 
after the turn of the century while birth rates remained high, and a rapid net 
growth resulted. Fertility levels have been falling since the late 1960's, and 
growth is slowing considerably on a percentage-per-year basis, although the 
raw number added to the population each year is still Increasing. 
Furthermore, urbanization levels have been steadily climbing for some time 
and increasing very rapidly in the more recent past. In some areas, the 
absolute levels are approaching urbanization levels of the developed world, 
although birth rates are not comparable in the two regions. It is tempting to 
try to attribute part of the fertility decline to Increases in urbanization, as 
is done when the Demographic Transition model Is used to explain the 
'European experience of the 1 9 ^  century. However, there is reason to 
believe that when one controls for variables that have a direct bearing on the 
fertility process such as education and family planning, the urbanization 
element does not contribute to fertility decline; although urbanization and 
fertility decline may be present together, they are coincident and may be 
correlated but not causally linked.
Earlier studies, such as that by Tolnay and Christenson (1984), found 
no significant relationship between the /eve/ of urbanization and the change 
In fertility, but they were looking at the entire Third World. Urbanization 
has occurred so rapidly in Latin America that It deserves to be considered 
separately in a more specific analysis that takas into aooount the rate and
2the level of urbanization.
The focus here Is to evaluate the nature and strength of the 
relationship between the rate of urbanization and the decline of the crude 
birth rate in Latin America. The goal of this study is to analyze the
proportionate rate of change in percent urban and its effect on the 
proportionate rate of change in the crude birth rate, while controlling for 
education, infant mortality, family planning effort, level of urbanization, and 
Income per capita. This means that instead of considering the first-degree 
relationship between the absolute amount of decline in fertility and the 
absolute increase In urbanization, the analysis will consider the link 
between rate of urbanization and rate of decline in fertility rate; this 
relationship will be evaluated using regression analysis. This may be likened 
to examining the second derivative of the equation rather than the first 
derivative, Its acceleration rather than just its velocity.
The point is that the rate of urbanization might be seen as something 
/ different than the level of urbanization. Even if the level of urbanization Is 
comparable to urbanization levels of developed countries, if this level has 
been reached 'overnight, the benefits of urbanization may be outweighed by 
disadvantages. The hypothesis is that urbanization that happens too quickly 
does not contribute to the social development of a country and may In fact be 
detrimental.
If our hypothesis is correct; urbanization rate should have no 
significant effect on Latin American fertility decline. The test of this 
hypothesis and the Interpretation of results will be oompared to a similar 
study of the Third World by Tolany and Christenson (1964).
3II. Background and Lite f  lure Hsvlaw
A. Trends Sines 1980 In Latin Amsrioan Fsrtlllty
After a long history of relatively moderate growth, the Latin 
American population growth rate began to skyrocket between 1950 and 1965, 
growing at 2.75 percent annually. Then, between 1965 and 1985, it began to 
slow down, Increasing at an average of 2.43 percent annually. (Merrick 1986,
7) Birth rate declines of over 25 percent occurred in a majority of 
countries between 1960*65 and 1980*85. (cited In Merrick 1986, 15; Tsui 
and Bogus: 11) But Merrick points out that even in countries where growth 
rates declined, their actual /eve/ remained high** three percent or more a 
year in Venezuela, Honduras, and Mexico, but below the 2.43 percent regional 
average in Cuba, Argentina, Uruguay, and Jamaica after 1965. (Merrick 1986:
8) This decline has been examined by many other researchers, including 
Steven Beaver (1975), who found ties between fertility declines and a 
variety of socioeconomic indicators. These factors will be examined In mere 
detail in section II C, while the biological determinants of fertility are 
discussed in II B.
Until the 1950's, the population of Latin America was very similar to 
that of the United States and was growing at a comparable rate. (Merrick 
1986: 3) In the Third World as a whole, the urban population went from 275 
million to 800 million people between 1980 and 1978. (During this time, 
Latin America participated fully In this population boom.) During the same 
time in the developed world, the population went *rom 800 million to 780 
million, an Inorease of two-and*a-half times as compared to an eightfold
4Increase in the Third World urban population. (Qoldsteln1983, 5)
There are some researchers who are trying to discover the underlying 
causes behind population trends in Latin America because they believe that 
the developing countries that make up Central and South America, truly a 
heterogenous group, could benefit from further reduction in their fertility 
rates. Already, declines have occurred in most of these countries, but in 
many the actual levels of fertility are still relatively high.
Rafael Salas is one who is finding numerous examples of Third World 
and Latin American urbanization without the expected accompanying 
development. (Salas1984, 45) Contrary to the idea that increasing 
proportions of people living in cities will automatically bring along 
economic growth, it has been found that in many Latin American countries, 
the experience has been one of urbanization without Industrialization, and 
the expected economies of scale are not developing. Instead, slums, 
shantytowns, and diseconomies have developed. (Salas1984, 45; Merrick 
1985) Large numbers of rural to urban migrants in the recent past are 
straining the urban service systems planned years ago. (Merrick 1986) 
Urbanization is intrinsically linked to many of the other determinants of 
fertility that will be discussed, such as education of women and influence of 
family planning programs.
There are many problems attributed to rapid growth and internal 
redistribution of population of the kind seen in Latin America after World 
War II, but the causes of these problems are not completely agreed upon. The 
contribution of migrants to such problem areas as urban natural Increase, 
unemployment, crime, health problems, po litica l instab ility and 
environmental deterioration is still In question, according to Goldstein.
5(1983, 14) Thomas Merrick cites deficits in education, housing, health 
services, urban transportation systems and other Infrastructure, and 
especially in employment. The results of the ensuing Industrializaton and 
rapid urbanization are slum housing, unemployment, urban poverty, strains 
on all urban services, and political unrest. (Merrick 1966, 6, 24)
Some researchers apply the Demographic Transition model, based on 
Britain's demographic experience of the late 1 9 ^  century, to countries like 
those in Latin America experiencing fertility decline today. Beaver (1975) 
has reconsidered the whole issue and added some qualifications to the model 
so that it can be applied to the Latin American case. A large number of 
researchers don't agree with the extant criticisms of the theory and have no 
trouble applying the model to Latin America, while others find it difficult to 
ju s tify .
It is Important to remember that the 19& century fertility declines in 
Britain took place without the benefit of modern family planning programs 
that are in existence in many Third World countries today. So this group of 
researchers maintains that social and economic variables once thought to 
have had great effect on the European transition were not at comparable 
levels at the time of those declines in the 19& century, and so couldn't have 
had as much of an Impact as was commonly attributed to them. (Tolnay and 
Christenson 1984, 75) Therefore, it Is even more risky to expect these same 
variables to decline in the same way In Latin America, especially since It is 
culturally quite distinct from Europe. The truth is that it is difficult even to 
generalize for Latin America as a whole, and much harder or even Impossible 
to create a model appropriate for the whole world. Part of the problem is 
due to the vague definition of the transition and the variables that are
6considered to be part of it. So perhaps trying to apply the Demographic 
Transition model to Latin America is incorrect unless it is modified for the 
Latin American context like Beaver has attempted to do. The view taken in 
this paper is summarized by the Tolnay study:
"Our reassessment of the impact of social setting variables on 
recent fertility declines, including their Indirect effects via 
family planning programs, is consistent with Demographic 
Transition Theory which specifies a critical link between socio­
economic development and fertility  decline, largely through 
changing reproductive motivation." (1964, 86)
B. Biological or Proximate Determinants of Fertility
Social and economic factors influence fertility In a society in a 
secondary manner. Fertility rates are directly controlled by well-defined 
biological actions, while "values [the socio-economic variables we will refer 
/to  later], In order to affect natality, must be translated into control over a 
biological process such as conception, gestation, or age at entry into unions." 
(Beaver 1975, 44) This section w ill explore these primary factors 
accounting for the biological side of the fertility equation or +he "supply" of 
children. (Bulatao and Lee 1963).
Marriage patterns which have Important effects on fertility Include 
average age at marriage and overall proportion of women ever-married. 
Tsui and Bogue explain that the age at marriage has been rising in many 
developing countries due to factors such as socioeconomic development, 
cultural variations, and family planning concerns. (Tsui and Bogue 1978, 17) 
This is only a part of the explanation for the falling birth rates evident In
7some of these countries, and shows an example of the link between 
socioeconomic variables and biological ones. For example, age at marriage 
will also be influenced by the amount of education the woman has. (Merrick 
1985, 15) But in the Population Bulletin Merrick urges caution In using 
marriage prevalence "as an indicator of exposure to the risk of conception* 
due to changes in the kinds of unions In operation. 'Consensual* unions in 
lieu of marriage *are becoming more common. . . and pregnancy itself may be 
the reason for formalizing the union.* (Merrick 1986: 20) Cnee a union of any 
kind exists, it is the practice of fertility control which affects the number 
of children born to a family.
The use of contraceptives is dependent, in turn, on the social and 
economic values of the population. 'Contraceptive use has gone up 
significantly in most Latin American countries and this has been by far the 
most important of the proximate determinants In recent fertility declines.* 
(Merrick 1986, 16) Tolnay and Christenson, whose study focused on the 
effects of family planning programs and social and economic conditions, 
'cannot necessarily endorse the belief that 'development is the best 
contraceptive' but could suggost that development and the best 
contraceptive Is a powerful combination, indeed.* (1984, 67) Another kind of 
contraception, although more indirect and perhaps less deliberate than the 
other methods, is the practice of breastfeeding. 'Prolonged breastfeeding of 
15 to 20 months, common In Africa and Asia, can lengthen the time between 
births and ultimately lower overall fertility by extending the period of 
women's natural infertility after childbirth,* says Merrick, But 10 months or 
less Is the average span for breastfeeding children In Latin America, which 
allows for little effect on birth rates. (1986, 18)
8Abortion is also a possibility for fertility control. It is prevalent all 
over the continent, although it is illegal in all Latin American countries 
except Cuba. But due to the secretive nature of the operations, it is hard to 
keep accurate records of occurrences. (Merrick 1986, 18)
Among unmarried adults, abstinence is another method of preventing 
the conception of a child. However, the recent increased existence of 
consensual unions has reduced pre-marital abstinence somewhat. Older 
adults may also decide that this Is the method they will use to keep from 
having more children.
Age structure is another important general component in overall 
growth rates. It Is "one of the principal ties between demographic processes 
and socioeconomic changes.” (Merrick 1986, 9) Women under 30 years old 
experienced the largest declines in age-specific fertility rates since 1965. 
*This suggests rising age at marriage has played an Important role In 
fertility decline.” (Tsui and Bcgue 1978, 16) Age structure will, however, 
slow the current decline In birth rates due to the exaggerated number of 
women in the younger age ranges resulting from the rapid growth before the 
1960's decline began. (Merrick 1986, 19) This Is the concept of population 
momentum in action; although the birth rate has declined, the number of 
births continues to rise. In the Latin American case, as In the rest of the 
Third World, it is the youth component rather than the elderly component 
that is the critical Issue in the very high dependency ratio. (Merrick 1986: 
10, 46)
As already stressed, the social and economic factors yet to be 
discussed affect fertility by working through the biological factors. An 
example of these linkages is the amount of education a woman has; It affects
9her age at marriage and the use of contraception, and these In turn affect 
how many children she has. (Merrick 1986, 16) We turn now to a discussion 
of these "secondary" but equally important factors.
C. Socioeconomic Determinants of Fertility
The secondary socioeconomic variables have both direct and indirect 
effects In the fertility  equation. The system of family planning 
organizations can be considered as direct attempts to influence the actual 
fertility control practiced by couples, while indirect factors such as amount 
of schooling, female participation in work force, existing Infant mortality 
rate, urbanization, and class status affect fertility by affecting the social 
situation in which a woman or a couple lives and works, and operates through 
such intermediary variables as the biological factors and family planning 
effort to affect the "demand" for children. (Bulatao and Lee 1983) Tolnay and 
Christenson s study separated family planning from social setting indicators 
to assess the different nature of these variables. Tsui and Bogue found that 
"the higher socioeconomic development level reached in 1975, the greater 
the average decline in total fertility rate (TFR) between 1968 and 1975." 
(1978, 22)
Family planning programs try to directly Influence the fertility 
practices by trying to control supply (listed as biological determinants) and 
by helping couples to realize their own goals of reduced demand for children 
by supplying information and health assistance. (Beaver 1975) Family 
planning Is listed as a factor on the socioeconomic side of the equation 
because a country's willingness to implement such a program is related to 
the unique social, cultural, and economlo characteristics of each country.
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Several studies have concluded that family planning programs do have 
significant effects on fertility rates In developing countries. (Tsui and 
Bogus 1978, 24; Tolnay and Christenson 1984, 86) In fact, Tolnay and 
Christenson cite two more studies: one by Freedman and Berelson (1976), and 
the other by Mauldin and Berelson (1978). Both studies found that family 
planning effort "explained more unique variation than social setting In 
fertility decline between 1965 and 1975," and that "the combined effects of 
indirect and direct effects approached the Impact of family planning" in the 
sixty-five developing countries investigated. (Tolnay and Christenson1984, 
73)
One criticism of these programs Is that they only work In certain 
situations and that noticeable declines in fertility only occur when a certain 
level of "development" has been acheived. Davis (1967) concluded that 
"contraception itself Is not a driving force bringing about reduced fertility; 
rather, it simply helps translate other social changes into sustained fertility 
declines." This echoes the sentiments of Demeny (1979) and van de Walle 
(1980), who are also skeptical about the success of family planning in 
countries where reduced fertility has not already begun, (cited In Tolnay and 
Christenson 1984, 73)
Fertility decline has already begun In Latin America, and as will be 
shown in the empirical section, has been affected somewhat by family 
planning, although education is the main factor In this case.
Tolnay and Christenson have found that "family planning program 
effort, itself, is to some extent a product of pre-existing social conditions 
faced by a nation" but that the programs were equally effective In situations 
both with and without previous fertility decline. (1984, 85) They found that
11
the most critical elements of "social conditions" were infant mortality 
levels and school enrollment, defined as percent of children age 15-19 in 
school. (1984, 86) This situation applies well to the Latin American case, as 
we will see in the methodology section of this study.
The socio-economic variables make up the other half of the secondary 
components in fertility decline. Heading the list of secondary determinants 
of fertility Is the level of education. This can be measured in several 
different ways by including unique components of the population. School 
enrollment as a percent of all children of schoolable age, and the average 
years of schooling achieved by the population in general are common 
definitions of education. It has been found in several studies that the 
education of w om en is the most decisive factor relating to fertility. 
However, Rodriguez and Cleland caution that while it is true that the largest 
ranges in fertility In the world are found In Latin America, "where fertility 
declines steadily as w ife's education Increases," the results "often 
attributed to women's education reflect Instead a more general effect of 
socioeconomic status." (Rodriguez and Cleland 1981, 97) This is an example 
of the difficulties in measuring secondary effects.
It Is true that the education of women has increased "significantly" in 
Latin America in the last three decades. "These and other changes affected 
the social and economic groups whose fertility had been highest and without 
whose participation the rapid fertility decline would not have occurred." 
(Merrick 1986: 18; Tsui and Bogus 1978, 19)
The participation of women in the work force has been found to be
12
another important contributor to fertility decline, and it is linked to 
women's education as well. In Latin America, only 18 percent of the 
non-agricultural work force Is comprised of women, compared to percents 
ranging up to 32 percent in other developing areas of the world. North Africa 
had the only lower score, with 8 percent of the women working. (Merrick 
1986: 32) The combination of differences in education and employment 
opportunities for women has been found to "account for one-half of the 
differential between rural and urban fertility." (Rodriguez and Cleland 1981, 
93)
Contrary to common belief, the work status of the husband had a 
minimal role in the socioeconomic equation of fertility. (Rodriguez and 
Cleland 1981, 93, 96)
Another commonly considered variable in literature on the 
Demographic Transition Is Income, usually measured as GNP per capita. Tsui 
and Bogue cite inconclusive results on the effect of this variable on fertility 
(1978, 19). Tolnay and Christenson found (to their surprise) that GNP per 
capita was virtually unimportant In the equation (1984,84). Many studies 
find the effects of this factor hard to characterize. (See Beaver 1975 for 
example) The present study found no relationship between GNP per capita 
and fertility decline. Perhaps when the actual distribution of income is 
uneven among the population, such as it is in Latin America, its impact on 
fertility is not captured by measures of average income across the 
population as a whole. Merrick hints at this double standard, saying that 
because the middle- and upper-income women can hire child-cere, they can 
worn and have children, while toawr-lncome women have to make a oholce 
between haviu# a Job and taking care of their children. (Merrick 1986, 17)
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Infant mortality rate is a way to measure Income and living 
conditions and it is inherently tied to many of the other socioeconomic 
variables, especially education. Merrick describes the class differentials In 
rates of infant mortality, mentioning the 'persistent gaps between rich and 
poor." (Merrick 1986,14) It has been found that declines In infant mortality 
rates tend to be related to declines in birth rates for the simple reason that 
"a better health environment reduces the need for excessive fertility to 
ensure survival to adulthood.* (Tsui and Bogus 1978, 19) Tolnay and 
Christenson concur; they believe that both general and infant mortality are 
responsive to characteristics of the social setting. (1984, 79)
It is sometimes assumed that the Catholic church is to blame for high
Latin American fertility rates. But the effects of the wide nominal 
participation In the Catholic church does not have the effect on fertility that 
is commonly perceived. This can be seen in the practice of abortion, although 
illegal, and birth control through contraception. At the popular level,
f
'religious affiliation does not imply strict adherence to Church teachings" 
(including its conservative stance .on family planning). (Merrick 1986, 41; 
Beaver 1975, 51). However, although the pro-natallst viewpoint of the
Catholic church may not have much effect on individual behavior, "in the
political arena the Church's influence on government decision-makers is 
often crucial.* (Jones 1981, 190)
We come now to the discussion of urbanization, the variable under 
investigation In this study. It is seen as an important factor by some 
writers in discussions of the Demographic Transition. There are researchers 
who see the positive side of urbanization and its positive relationship with
14
Transition theory, such as Beaver (1975), Tolnay and Christenson (1984), and 
Banguero and Guerrero (1983). Transition theory suggests to them that the 
"economic burden of children is expected to be greater in cities than in the 
countryside," a disadvantage to higher fertility in cities. There are more 
non-agricultural employment opportunities for women In the city, delaying 
marriage and reducing fertility . Finally, more "efficient modes of 
communication in urban centers facilitate the spread of what Caldwell 
(1976) calls 'westernization'." (cited in Tolnay and Christenson 1984, 77) 
The Implication is that higher levels of urbanization go hand In hand with 
reduced fertility. Beaver includes urbanization as one of the three key 
factors, the other two being education and "levels of living.” (1975, 58)
A higher level of urbanization is usually expected to accommodate 
"westernization" and have a positive direct effect on fertility decline. 
Indirect effects are also expected, for example, If popular demand for better 
distribution of family planning resources is shown, the nation may decide to 
go ahead and spend more on these programs. It is also suggested that better 
health care facilities In cities will have a negative effect on infant 
mortality, leading to decreased fertility. (Tolnay and Christenson: 78) And 
the present study found that school enrollment had a significant effect on 
Latin American fertility decline. A question to be pursued in further research 
Is whether or not these facilities are evenly distributed and accessible to 
people within each city.
In Latin America, where many countries have achieved urbanization 
levels similar to Western countries, "urbanism* or "westernization" may or 
may not be present. The existence of large urban centers may make it 
possible for more contact between couples and health, education, and family
15
planning facilities, but this does not occur simply by virtue of the city's 
existence. In the Western experience, cities have traditionally been 
unhealthy places to live in because of the character of the city— industrial, 
crowded, poor in certain sections, and lacking sufficient sanitation. It may 
be that in the Latin American case, given the rapid rate of urbanization, a 
similar problem situation exists today due to the possibility of uneven 
development within cities leading to unequal access to health and education 
centers.
Goldstein (1983) expounds on the counter-side of urbanization and 
insists ’hat it has a negative effect on development; concurring authors 
include Goldscheider (1983), Rondinelli (1983), who emphasize the 
development of secondary cities, Arriaga, who argues against any application 
of Transition Theory to Latin America (cited in Beaver 1975), and Ulack and 
Lelnbach (1985), who say, "A large body of literature has developed from the 
premise that rapid urban growth in the Third World poses a major threat to 
the achievement of various social and economic goals." (1985, 310)
An important component in the population growth issue is the 
distribution of this growth. In Latin America, urban areas are growing faster 
than rural areas. This is due to the rapid migration of people from rural 
areas to the cities and larger towns and also due to natural increase within 
the city. Rural-urban migration is happening at a very rapid rate and, in 
many countries, is focused on only one or two primate cities. The existing 
urban Infrastructure Is Incapable of handling the added strains of this 
unexpected massive population. One concern that arises is whether or not an 
Increase in the level of urbanization is of the same "quality" as urbanization 
occurring at a more moderate pace.
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Part of this concern stems from the idea that primate cities, the 
inordinately large urban centers evident in several Latin American countries, 
are the centers of a focused rural-urban migration stream and cannot seem 
to divert people to secondary cities; diversion to growth poles could make 
the final step-by-step migration to the biggest cities a smoother process, 
allowing migrants more chances to assimilate. As it is, major cities are 
staggering under the strain. Rondinelli explains:
Using rough but conservative estimates, Unikel found in 1970 
that if Mexico City reached a projected population of 21 million 
by 1990, the national government would have to spend the 
equivalent (in 1970 dollars) of about $3.2 billion a year over the 
next 20 years to settle new migrants within the city and to 
supply the existing population with minimal housing, water, 
electricity, transportation, and health and educational services. .
. . It is equivalent to establishing a city comparable in size to 
Guadalajara, Mexico's second largest metropolis, every year.
(1983, 32)
If urbanization is not causally linked to fertility, it is possible that it 
could be made to be helpful by Improving the quality of the urbanization 
going on and allowing It to assist In the development process. "Secondary 
cities can and must contribute to developm ent- deconcentratlng 
urbanization, reducing regional inequalities, Increasing administrative 
capacity, reducing urban poverty, and stimulating rural economies.” 
(Rondinelli 1983) Under this scenario, even if the same number of people 
decide to leave the rural areas for the cities, they will have more 
destinations to choose from, instead of Inundating one major city. More 
slowly growing cities, in turn, may have more opportunity to Improve social 
services at a rate comparable to the growth of their population.
17
The question Is whether or not rural migrants have trouble 
assimilating urban fertility values. Of interest is the change in fertility 
rate once migrants arrive in the city. This variable is implicitly related to
the assimilation of other elements of the urban value system. Does the>
number of children desired by a couple automatically drop when they move to 
the city? Or, does It take some time for the urban value system to sink in, 
thus showing a delayed drop in national fertility rates in relation to the rate 
of urbanization? Perhaps it is true that better availability of contraceptives 
in the city makes it possible for couples to actually control family size. 
(Beaver1975)
Some of the models assume that fertility decline is expected to 
mirror changes in urbanization, simply because rural- urban migrants change 
automatically to "urban" fertility patterns. Goldstein explains that "the 
literature on the dynamics of migrant adaptation to the urban environment 
and culture-...[including] whether they adopt the lower fertility levels that 
generally characterize the urban population, and a host of other questlons-- 
is by no means conclusive." (1983, 16) Goldstein himself expresses concern 
with the "increasing concentration of people in urban places, particularly in 
big cities. This latter process is often associated with a number of adverse 
situations, including... [migrants having a hard time finding work in the city, 
unbalanced development of different urban areas, Inadequate housing and 
social services, environmental contamination, and] social-psychological 
stress among both natives and migrants as they compete tor limited Jobs and 
for access to health and educational facilities and living space." (1983, 3) 
The process of urban- rurallzatlon evident In some cities suggests the rural 
migrants' need to form a cohesive society of their own within the unfamiliar
. . A « .
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urban context.
Some of the problems associated with a rapid increase in urbanization 
level have been addressed by Merrick (1986), who discusses rapid urban 
growth and unemployment, rapid social and economic change, and the effects 
of rate of change in percent urban on the rate of change in fertility. He 
points out that in many cases shantytowns exist because they do provide 
inexpensive housing with little overhead costs to migrants. The residents of 
shantytowns tend not to be the newest migrants to the city, but rather 
earlier migrants who have found that other kinds of housing are not 
affordable. (Merrick 1986: 22) Another question that would be interesting 
to pursue concerns fertility differentials within cities: distribution and 
persistence of high birth rates correlated with the migrants' length of time 
in the city.
Rural-urban migration is not the only element of importance in the 
study of urbanization since the rate of growth of the city population from 
within is the major contributor to increases in city size and hence to 
increases in both level and rate of urbanization. "Rapid urban growth in less- 
developed nations is. . . inextricably interwoven with rapid natural increase" 
since, In the Third World as a whole, natural Increase in urban areas accounts 
for 61% of growth, whereas migration contributes 39%. (Goldstein 1983, 9)
Two groups of opinions have developed In recent studies. As explained 
by Goldstein, the first group stresses the difficulties the migrant has to 
overcome in the city and the negative consequences of migration to receiving 
areas and to the quality of life of the Individual migrant. The opposing view 
emphasizes continuity of fife in rural and urban areas, the opportunities in 
urban places for migrants and positive gains resulting from migration.
19
(Goldstein 1983, 4)
The one point of agreement between the two schools is the concept of 
lag time. Tolnay and Christenson (1984) also built lag times into their 
model without really discussing the rationale behind doing so; they use data 
from different years for different variables. School enrollment was from 
1960, family planning index was from 1972, and infant moratllty rate from 
1968, while the dependent variable, percent decline in percent urban, was 
calculated for the 1965-1975 interval. Beaver incorporates ten and fifteen 
year lags in urbanization into his regression model testing Transition Theory 
variables and their relation to fertility. His results claim a zero-order 
correlation of -.720 between urbanization level and crude birth rate. 
(Beaver1975,125)
The need for a lag-time component indicates again that assimilation 
of rural migrants and migrants from small cities into a big urban area such 
as a primate city is an important factor when urbanization and urbanism are 
under investigation. 'Transition theory suggests that the values and 
attitudes governing family size take some time to respond to a changing 
social environment* (Jones 1981, 134. Italics mine.) Measuring changes in 
fertility is a way to approximate the changes in values associated with 
urbanism.
Hi. Baaaareh Daalan
The relationship tested In this paper asks whether the percent decline 
In the crude birth rate in Latin America over a ten-year interval is affected 
by socioeconomic variables such as family planning effort, education, infant
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mortality, GNP per capita, percent urban, and change In percent urban. Tolnay 
and Christenson (1984) evaluated the same relationship In their 1984 study 
on the effects of social setting and family planning programs on recent 
fertility declines in developing countries.
All the variables In the present study, except change in percent urban, 
were the same ones used by Tolnay and Christenson. The biggest difference 
between this study and Tolnay's is that family planning programs turned out 
to have much less influence in Latin America than in the Third World as a 
whole.
A. Operational D efin itions and Data
In all the studies and literature there are inconsistencies or 
discrepancies In certain definitions of important variables, and often it is 
hard to measure various data beoause of lack of Information or other 
difficulties with the measurement of variables. Therefore, much of the time 
the models that are created to deal with 'factors affecting birth rate," for 
example, become useful only in specific cases. This section will describe 
some of these problems and some of the definitions commonly used.
The first problem to consider Is how to measure the fertility rate, 
since It Is the main focus of this and so many other studies. There are 
different measures of fertility, and each one has it advantages because of 
the added amount of information It can provide. The crude birth rate is the 
least detailed of these measures, giving the number of babies born per 
thousand of the mid-year population. It doesn't indicate the relative number 
of children per woman or age structure of population or which age group of 
the women Is the most fertile or women 'exposed* to childbearing. However,
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crude birth rate Is the most readily available measure. Total Fertility rate, 
age-specific birth rate , child-woman ratio, and even general fertility rate 
are more useful to have, but the difficulty is finding the sources to provide 
the necessary information. (Jones 1981, 91)
Education is another factor which can be measured in several different 
ways or using different criteria. UNESCO reports education using the 
proportion of adults aged 25 ana over who have had no schooling. Another 
measure of education is the age-specific school enrollment ratio. (Merrick 
1986: 33)
Shortage of data is a common setback in studies of Latin America. 
Estimates are used in many cases simply because the censuses and 
registration systems cannot account for everyone accurately. (Tsui and 
Bogue1978, 9) Severe undercounts occur, especially for children under five. 
The Mauldin and Berelson data set of crude birth rate decline in Third World 
countries that Tolnay and Christenson used for their path analysis model did 
not list any of the relevant data for Argentina and so this eountry could not 
be included in the calculations of statistics using that data set. Another 
setback occurs when the data that is collected is reported in a slanted 
manner to reflect positively on the current government. An organiztion 
called CELADE (United Nations Latin American Demographic Center), based in 
Chile, compiles data sets that anticipate some of these deficiencies and 
attempts to correct for them. (Merrick 1986, 6)
Studies dealing with the effects of urbanization must first define 
what is meant by "urban area," usually in terms of population. The wide 
range of this definition among studies is enough to raise some questions. 
The United Nations rates communities with more than 20,000 inhabitants as
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urban, and for the Latin American case this seems more appropriate. Other 
studies, such as the widely-cited Mauldin and Berelson study, use 100,000 
people as their minimum for an "urban” area. This leaves smaller countries 
such as Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago with zero percent of their population 
defined as "urban."
Next, it is necessary to find variables which will help measure this 
concept called "urbanism," which is the "western" mindset that is assumed to 
accompany urbanization. Since this is an abstract concept, surrogate 
variables are needed In order to measure urbanism. This is the point at 
which all the socioeconomic variables listed above come into play; they are 
meant to indicate different aspects of life which could potentially change 
when a move to a new place (such as from the country to a large town or 
city) takes place. "Urbanism" could also be reflected In changes In birth 
rates, influenced Indirectly through the socioeconomic variables.
Changes in mindset related to urbanism take some time to be 
assimilated by newcomers and even longer to actually have effects on their 
choices and actions. Tsui and Bogue try to adjust for lag time In their model 
by using data from different years, hoping that they have chosen appropriate 
intervals. (1978, 30). Tolnay and Christenson acknowledge that there is a lag 
and that the best thing for long-term interests of the developing world is to 
invest right away in family planning programs in order to "initiate or 
accelerate a fertility decline." (1984, 67) Beaver (1975) uses lagged 
variables as well. Jones (1981) also mentions their importance.
The need for the socioeconomic (secondary) variables to operate 
through the biological (primary) factors has already been discussed. Another 
theoretical problem Is In measuring the effects of these socioeconomic
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variables. Regression analysis accounts for the direct effects, but path 
analysis, used by Tolnay and Christenson, and also Mauldin and Berelson 
(1978), tries to take into account the effects of secondary variables such as 
"status," "education," or "urbanization" on fertility rates.
The inconsistent definition of Latin America in the literature has also 
already been mentioned. The region is defined as containing 20-22 different 
countries, each having its own cultural heritage, government, Ideology, 
social and economic conditions, and so on. Every study seems to include a 
slightly different collection of countries that it defines as belonging to 
"Latin America." Countries in question include Surinam, Guyana, Barbados, 
Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, and Haiti. The range of definitions goes from all 
countries south of the United States to the CELADE definition which Includes 
the 18 countries where Spanish is spoken (but not Puerto Rico) and Brazil. 
(Merrick 1986, 3)
B. S tatistica l Analysis
The Tolnay study was chosen as a base because it evaluated variables 
in relation to changes in the crude birth rate for sixty-five developing 
countries. It was this emphasis on rate of change, rather than actual level, 
as well as the fact that it included most of the standard transition theory 
determinants of fertility that we used it as a base. Tolnay's study
. . .estimates the relative effects of social setting and family 
planning programs on recent declines in fertility in developing 
countries. . . . Consideration of total effects, direct effects and 
Indirect effects of all variables suggests that family planning 
program effort has, by far, the largest direct effect on fertility 
declines. However, social setting, especially school enrollment 
and Infant mortality, has substantial indirect effects. (Tolnay
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and Christenson 1984, 72)
The data set used in this study is based on two sources: Tsui and 
Bogue for family planning index 1972 (which they based on a family planning 
program effort scale by Lapham and Berelson), and Mauldin and Berelson for 
infant mortality 1968 [iFMORT], per capita QNP 1960 [QNP], percent urban 
1960 [PURBAN], and percent aged 15-19 enrolled in school 1960 [SCHOOL], 
and the dependent variable, percent decline in crude birth rate 1965-75 
[DCBR].
Proportionate, rather than absolute, fertility change is used 
since larger absolute changes are likely to occur In high fertility 
settings. To illustrate, a drop of five births per 1000 population 
is more significant when it occurs to a base crude rate of 20 
than to a base rate of 50. (Tolnay and Christenson 1984, 80)
Characteristics of the Tolnay and Christenson study which didn't seem 
appropriate included the definition of "urban” as 100,000 or more 
inhabitants, as opposed to the United Nations definition using 20,000 
inhabitants; here the variable on urbanization rate assumes a level of 20,000 
people as urban. Gilbert, however, in his study of the spatial allocation of 
health and education facilities in Third World countries indicated that 
100,000 population level was a clear breaking point in distribution of these 
institutional facilities which do have a great effect on fertility and 
mortality as well. (1974)
One other problem was that the data set used by Tolnay and 
Christenson included no data from Argentina on the relevant variables in the 
data set, requiring this country to be omitted from the present study.
In the results obtained using path analysis, the total variation in
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proportionate change in CBR explained by all of their variables was 65%. 
Tolnay's study found that family planning and school enrollment were the 
only two variables to have significant effects on recent fertility decline, 
contributing 71% and 24% respectively to the percent decline in crude birth 
rate. The other variables made negligible contributions.
Now we come to the core of this study, modifying the Tolnay model by 
adding rate of urbanization variables and applying it to the Latin American 
case. In order to parallel Tolnay's emphasis on rate of change, the 
urbanization variables used here, URBRONE and URBRATE, are proportionate 
ones, defined as percent change in percent urban. For example,
Urban I960 -  % Urban 1950 
;0 Urban 1950
gives 1950 to 1960 rate of change. The Statistical Yearbook for Latin 
America is the source from which I calculated rates of urbanization for two 
ten-year intervals (1950 to 1960 [URBRONE] and 1960 to 1970 [URBRATE]). 
The graph on the next page shows the differences In rate and level of 
urbanization for most of the Latin American countries.
For the emulation of their study in this paper, regression analysis is 
used on twenty Latin American countries. The countries included in this 
study are: Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Dominincan Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.
One difference between Tolnay and Christenson's study and this one is 
that only twenty Latin American countries are used here, instead of the 
sixty-five Third World countries. Their study was not precisely reproduced 
for this paper since Tolnay did not specify which sixty-five countries were
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chosen out of the available data set, which contained data for ninety-five 
Third World countries. The focus on Latin America surely brought out some of 
the cultural differences between Latin America and the rest of the Third 
World, which is why these results deviated from the Tolnay study, (see table 
below.) Another difference is that they used path analysis to evaluate 
variable interrelationships, while regression analysis is used here.
The results are summarized in the table below. It is important to note 
that the variation explained by the same variables drops Immediately to 76% 
in this Latin American version as contrasted to the original Tolnay study of 
developing nations, where amount of variation explained by the model was 
65%. Family planning plummets from 71% to 19% of the explanation, and 
school enrollment becomes the most significant contributor, adding 41% to 
the explanatory power of the model. This could very well be related to basic 
cultural and historical differences in Latin America as compared to other 
Third World areas that were included In the Tolnay study. It may be that 
fertility patterns in Latin America are much different than patterns in the 
rest of the Third World and so the results are not comparable. (This is the 
kind of situation that regional geographers like to study.) The decreasing 
effect of the family planning variable is an indication of the difference in 
orientation toward schooling in the Latin American fertility experience.
After running the first Latin American version of the Tolnay study, we 
ran more regression equations, adding the rate of urbanization variable for 
1950 to 1960 and 1960 to 1970 and eventually deleting the family planning 
and school variables which had initially controlled so much of the model 
explanation.
CHANGES fa flERCEKT ur&qis/
.Rs-o -  m o
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FAMPLAN GNP SCHOOL IFMQRT % URBAN 1JBRATE URBRONE f& -
A A A  A A A * *  A A A  A A t  OKI**Tolnay .711** .044 .240** .041 .097 .851
Run #1 .189** .055 .406 .106 .005 .761
Run #2 .182** .055 .406 .106 .004 .010 .762
Run #3 .055 .406* .106* .004 .010 .580
Run #4 .050 .406* .093* .005 .001 .027 .583
Run #5 .048 .406* .093* .005 .027 .580
Run #6 .077 .166* .068 .009 .094 .413
Run #7 .137 .038 .080 .255
Run #8 .137* .107
Run #9 .160* .160'
Run #10 .108 .108
Significance: M  level **.01 level
It Is evident from the table that even after Family Planning and School 
are deleted after Run #5, the urbanization rates components show no 
significant relationship to rate of fertility decline. Immediately, in this 
case, infant mortality takes up some of the slack. As soon as SCHOOL and 
FAMPLAN are removed from the model In Run #6, the predictive value of the 
model drops to 41%. Infant mortality is removed in the next run, leaving only 
the urbanization variables to explain change in fertility, and the r-square 
drops down to 25% and lower beginning in Run #7 It becomes evident that 
even without the involvement of the other socioeconomic variables, 
urbanization has a minimal effect on the dependent variable. The strongest 
result from among the urbanization variables was the 16% explanation 
offered by URBRATE (rate of urbanization between 1950 and 1960) In 
explaining the 1965 to 1975 CBR decline In Run #9. Obviously neither the 
rate of urbanization nor the level of urbanization has any effect on fertility 
decline when we control for the effects of education and family planning.
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If time permitted, several changes would be made in the framework of 
this study, no longer basing itself on the Tolnay study. All these trials 
would be repeated with a new data set that includes Argentina and includes 
urbanization data with a threshold of 20,000 people. It would use a more 
sophisticated measure of fertility, something like total fertility rate 
adjusted for the age-sex structure of the population, it would also be 
beneficial to allow for the Sag effect in a more precise or systematic 
manner. Several new variables that would be helpful to consider Include: 
women's participaton rate in non- agricultural labor force, and a measure of 
primacy (perhaps using percent of the total population In the major city). 
Many of these variables can be equated with "urbanism," or the mindset 
assumed to accompany urbanization. Since the number of cases cannot 
really exceed much more than twenty if only the countries of Latin America 
are used as units, the choice of variables must be very selective in order to 
keep degrees of freedom at a maximum.
1¥j__ Summary and Coneluelona
The view held in this study Is that Latin America needs to continue to 
reduce Its birth rates, despite the major reductions that have already 
occurred. Mortality rates are going to continue to fall as health care 
improves, and this will widen the gap between births and deaths again, 
leading to increased net growth. Ultimately, the continued decline in 
fertility would also ease some of the strain on social systems such as
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schools, hospitals, public services, and housing. The result would be 
increased living standards as long as the benefits of the new social 
prosperity were equally accessible in both a spatial and a financial sense. 
As It stands, this is not the case.
It must not be assumed that education automatically increases or that 
infant mortality goes down just because urbanization occurs. There is more 
to development than redistribution of people; it must be accompanied by 
more involvement with planning and exension of social services in urban 
areas, which is easier said than done. "The costs of meeting social needs in 
the largest metropolitan centers are. . . beyond the potential capacity of 
developing nations to pay." (Rondlnelli 1983, 31)
In 1976, only a few countries in Latin America (see map on next page) 
Mexico and Colombia being the major ones, had official policies to reduce 
population growth rate. The other countries did have official support for 
family planning activities, which were "supported essentially on grounds of 
health, human rights, and family welfare, regardless of any national 
demographic Impact," and were not financed by their governments. (Jones 
1981, 190) Part of the reason for lack of official government policy is due 
to the "suspicion that United States imperialism has been imposing birth 
control as a means of limiting the emerging power of Latin America." (Jones 
1981, 190) Ironically, they allow family planning for the "wrong” reasons, 
but with the "right" intended result: an improved quality of life. Outside
planners don't always consider the surroundings In which their programs 
have to function; as we have seen, however, outright family planning In Latin 
America only works when paired with social improvement, and even then, 
family planning effort is not the most critical factor in fertility decline.
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Considering the results of this study, policy tkers in Latin America 
who do consider their birth rates to be excessive should not count on the 
urbanization factor alone for help in lowering fertility rates. Rondinelli's 
case for the development of secondary cities explains the need for better 
quality of urbanization, and again the need for more equal distribution of 
available services. Any country hoping for improvement based solely on 
unplanneu rural urban migration or urban growth will undoubtedly be 
disappointed.
In considering the direct effects of family planning and the indirect 
effects of school enrollment on infant mortality, Tolnay and Christenson 
concluded It is the jo int influence of social setting and family planning 
programs that has made the biggest impact on the rate of fertility decline. 
(1984, 84)
However, the results of the Latin American case point toward the 
decreased importance of family planning and the increased value of some of 
the indirect variables in the search for reduced fertility rates; hence, the 
policy emphasis in this region should reflect this difference. Tolnay 
explains that "Implementation of certain social changes may have important 
effects on reproductive motivation and fertility trends. For example, a clear 
implication of our findings is that national investments made towerd 
reducing infant mortality and expanding educational attainment may have 
beneficial, unintended, effects of lowering birth rates." (1984, 86)
The original 30a! of this paper was to try to show that very rapid 
urbanization had a negative, dampening effect on fertility decline in Latin 
America. However, this more complex problem remains for future study and 
the availability of more comprehensive data.
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This study indicates that implementation of a national family planning 
program in Latin America without emphasis on other social development will 
not be ve'.y effective. Jones explains that "AID missions in Latin America 
were advised to consider population programs a priority area," but nothing is 
mentioned about education or other social services. (1981, 189) Since 
education and infant mortality showed up as important elements in 
determining fertility decline in Latin America, "family planning" effort 
should be expanded to include more basic educational skills and more 
broad-based health care, including post-natal medical help. This way, any 
international aid organizations that care to help will be spending their 
money more effectively.
Future studies of the effect of urbanization rate on fertility decline 
must consider some of the qualifications that have been made here. Some 
important issues have been brought to light, the most Important among them 
being that urbanization has not made a positive impact on fertility decline in 
Latin America. The results of this study indicate that in the Latin American 
case, urbanization has no significant effect on fertility when other 
socioeconomic variables are entered into the regression equation as a kind of 
control. Education proved to be the most important contributor to fertility 
decline, and further investigation will certainly yield more detailed results 
on the question concerning whether or not rapid urbanization in fact has a 
negative effect on declines in the birth rate. In the meantime, this first step 
has been taken.
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